Emergent Causation and Property Causation

Emergence in Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Noordhof, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Causal theory of properties; Counterfactual; Counterpart; Emergence; Emergent causation; Emergent dualism; Non reductive physicalism; Physical; Property causation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921258871     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0006     Document Type: Chapter

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