The No-Self Alternative

The Oxford Handbook of the Self

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Metzinger, Thomas ^a  

^a JOHANNES GUTENBERG UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Brains; First person perspective; No self alternative; Self; Self consciousness; Subjectivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925860737     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.003.0012     Document Type: Chapter

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