Getting the story right: a Reductionist narrative account of personal identity

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 171, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 445-469

  Schroer, Jeanine Weekes ^a   Schroer, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA DULUTH   (United States)

Author keywords

Narrative; Personal identity; Reductionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84912079304     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0278-z     Document Type: Article

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