Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap

Emergence in Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Crane, Tim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Emergence; Explanatory gap; Physicalism; Reductionism; Supervenience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921258573     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

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