Behavioral public choice: The behavioral paradox of government policy

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2015, Pages 973-1007

  Viscusi, W Kip ^a   Gayer, Ted ^b  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938220290     PISSN: 01934872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (92)

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