Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2017, Pages 329-349

  Chapman, Terrence ^a   Fang, Songying ^b   Li, Xin ^b   Stone, Randall W ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS   (United States)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937830427     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123415000216     Document Type: Conference Paper

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