Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 1-28

  Bas, Muhammet A ^a   Stone, Randall W ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Growth; IMF; Strategic statistical models

Indexed keywords

EID: 84893938602     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-013-9173-1     Document Type: Article

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