It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 116, Issue , 2015, Pages 481-499

  Rand, David G ^a   Fudenberg, Drew ^b   Dreber, Anna ^c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Intentions; Prisoner's dilemma; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84934981887     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.05.013     Document Type: Article

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