Towards an integrative account of social cognition: Marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of Type 1 and Type 2 processes

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue SEPTEMBER, 2012, Pages

  Bohl, Vivian ^a,c   van den Bos, Wouter ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TARTU   (Estonia)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Dual process theories; Interactionism; Social cognition; Social interaction; Theory of mind; Type 1 processes; Type 2 processes

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITIVISM; EXECUTIVE FUNCTION; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; MENTAL CAPACITY; MENTAL HEALTH; MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH; NEUROPHYSIOLOGY; NEUROPSYCHOLOGY; NONHUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; SOCIAL ATTITUDE; SOCIAL COGNITION; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; THEORY OF MIND; WORKING MEMORY;

EID: 84933680104     PISSN: 16625161     EISSN: 16625161     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00274     Document Type: Article

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