Body-self dualism in contemporary ethics and politics

Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-222

  Lee, Patrick ^a   George, Robert P ^b  

^a FRANCISCAN UNIVERSITY OF STEUBENVILLE   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929850640     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511509643     Document Type: Book

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