Varieties of hedonism

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 240-256

  Sobel, David ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847306556     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0047-2786.00007     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. A fourth understanding of pleasure, derived from the work of Shelly Kagan and Leonard Katz, is critically addressed in my "Pleasure as a Mental State", Utilitas 11, no. 2(July 1999):230-35.
2. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Prometheus Books, 1988), 29-42.
3. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Hackett Publishing, 1981), 131.
4. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford University Press, 1979), 40-41.
5. Frankena, Ethics (Prentice-Hall, 1963), 68-69.
6. Mill, Utilitarianism (Hackett, 1979), chap. 2.
7. The list is Bentham's, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, 30.
8. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 127.
9. See Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1954), chap. 4, esp. 109.
10. Alston, "Pleasure", 342.
11. Railton, "Naturalism and Prescriptivity", Social Philosophy and Policy 7(1989):151-74.
12. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 16.
13. Moore, "Reply to My Critics", in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Schilpp (Open Court Press, 1968), 665.
14. See the first few pages of Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton's "Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends", Philosophical Review 101(1992):115-89.
15. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), 42-45.
16. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford University Press, 1981);
17. Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality", reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Scheffler (Oxford University Press, 1988).
18. Leonard Katz, Hedonism as Metaphysics of Mind and Value (Ph. D. diss., Princeton University, 1985), 80.
19. Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Harvard University Press, 1993), 68
20. Kagan, "The Limits of Well-Being", in The Good Life and the Human Good, ed. Paul, Miller, and Paul (Cambridge University Press, 1992)
21. See also Senor and Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics (Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18.
22. Darwall, Impartial Reason (Cornell University Press, 1983), part II; and Harsanyi
23. "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior", in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55.
24. Railton offers this critique in "Moral Realism", Philosophical Review 95(1986):163-207, at 174.
25. Railton, "Facts and Values", Philosophical Topics 14(1986):16.
26. David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser. 63(1989):113-37.
27. I make this case much more fully in "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being", Ethics 104(1994):784-810.
28. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire, 55.
29. see Hurley, Natural Reasons (Oxford University Press, 1989)
30. Amos Tversky, in "A Critique of Expected Utility Theory", Erkenntnis 9(1975):163-73