A thomistic understanding of human death

Bioethics

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 29-48

  Eberl, Jason T ^a,b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BRAIN CELL; BRAIN DEATH; BRAIN FUNCTION; CONSCIOUSNESS; HEMISPHERE; HUMAN; LOGIC; METAPHYSICS; NEOCORTEX; NEUROBIOLOGY; RESPIRATORY ARREST; REVIEW; VISUAL CORTEX;

EID: 13444249997     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00423.x     Document Type: Review

References (102)

1. I am most grateful to Eleonore Stump, John Kavanaugh, S.J., Theodore Vitali, C.P., Michael Burke, and referees of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of this article. This article was written while I was visiting the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame and I thank Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and Michael Rea for making the Center's resources available to me. This article also benefited from being presented at the International Conference on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy at Fordham University in November 2003.
2. See: Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School. A Definition of Irreversible Coma. Journal of the American Medical Association 1968; 205: 337-340.
3. The whole-brain criterion has received legislative approval in several nations, including the US; see: President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 1981. Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Definition of Death. Washington, DC. US Government Printing Office. In addition, it has received moral approval from the Roman Catholic Church; see: John Paul II. Address to the International Congress on Transplants. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2001; 1: 89-92; R. White, H. Angstwurm & I. Carrasco de Paula, eds. 1992. Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death. Vatican City. Pontificia Academia Scientiarum.
4. The whole-brain criterion has received legislative approval in several nations, including the US; see: President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 1981. Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Definition of Death. Washington, DC. US Government Printing Office. In addition, it has received moral approval from the Roman Catholic Church; see: John Paul II. Address to the International Congress on Transplants. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2001; 1: 89-92; R. White, H. Angstwurm & I. Carrasco de Paula, eds. 1992. Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death. Vatican City. Pontificia Academia Scientiarum.
5. The whole-brain criterion has received legislative approval in several nations, including the US; see: President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 1981. Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Definition of Death. Washington, DC. US Government Printing Office. In addition, it has received moral approval from the Roman Catholic Church; see: John Paul II. Address to the International Congress on Transplants. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2001; 1: 89-92; R. White, H. Angstwurm & I. Carrasco de Paula, eds. 1992. Working Group on the Determination of Brain Death and Its Relationship to Human Death. Vatican City. Pontificia Academia Scientiarum.
6. Note that my concern here is with the concept of death for human beings only. I will not address any proposed concept of death for non-human organisms. Since Aquinas asserts that every human being is a person - see his Summa theologiae [ST]: IIIa.16.12.ad 1 - and personhood is thus essential to human nature, the terms 'human being', 'person', and 'human person' will be taken synonymously.
7. Following Aristotle, Aquinas defines a 'rational' soul as a soul that has the relevant capacities for life, sensation, and rational thought and is the type of soul proper to the human species. A 'sensitive' soul, on the other hand, has the relevant capacities for only life and sensation, and is the type of soul proper to all non-human species of the animal genus. A 'vegetative' soul has the relevant capacities for only life and is proper to all non-animal living organisms. See Aristotle. De anima: II.2-3.
8. Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles [SCG]: II.58. All translations of Aquinas are my own and are taken, unless otherwise noted, from the Leonine edition of Aquinas's works: Aquinas. 1882-. S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia. Rome. Commissio Leonina.
9. Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles [SCG]: II.58. All translations of Aquinas are my own and are taken, unless otherwise noted, from the Leonine edition of Aquinas's works: Aquinas. 1882-. S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia. Rome. Commissio Leonina.
10. For his assertion of (3), see Aquinas. Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis [QDSC]: IV; In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium [In DA]: II. 1; ST: IIIa.50.5.ad 1.
11. For his assertion of (3), see Aquinas. Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis [QDSC]: IV; In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium [In DA]: II. 1; ST: IIIa.50.5.ad 1.
12. Aquinas. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate [QDV]: XIII.4.ad 2.
13. Aquinas. Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi [In Sent]: I.8.v.3.ad 3. P. Mandonnet & M. Moos, eds. 1929-47. 4 Volumes. Paris. Lethielleux. This passage elucidates the second sense of 'to live' stated in the previous quotation.
14. See Aquinas. Quaestio disputata de anima [QDA]: IX.ad 13, X.ad 4, X.ad 11, XI.ad 16; In Sent: I.8.v.3.ad 3.
15. See Aquinas. Quaestio disputata de anima [QDA]: IX.ad 13, X.ad 4, X.ad 11, XI.ad 16; In Sent: I.8.v.3.ad 3.
16. See: QDA: X.ad 4.
17. See: QDA: XI.ad 16.
18. QDV: XIII.4.ad 2.
19. By 'individual contrary parts', Aquinas is referring to a human body's diverse organs and the basic elements constituting them.
20. QDV: XXV.6.
21. See QDA: VIII.ad 9, XIV.ad 13. Aquinas considers such 'defects' to be the result of original sin and not from the fact simpliciter of a human being's natural embodiment; see ST: Supp.75.1.ad 5.
22. See QDA: VIII.ad 9, XIV.ad 13. Aquinas considers such 'defects' to be the result of original sin and not from the fact simpliciter of a human being's natural embodiment; see ST: Supp.75.1.ad 5.
23. QDA: XIV.ad 20.
24. It is clear in both this passage and the preceding one that Aquinas is referring to a rational soul, as opposed to a vegetative or sensitive soul, since only a rational soul is incorruptible, as the soul is described in the preceding passage, and Aquinas does not entertain any discussion of vegetative or sensitive souls until QDA: XI, which comes after this passage.
25. QDA: IX.ad 16.
26. Once again, the context of this passage, in ST: Ia.76, which concerns the union of a rational soul to a body, makes it clear that Aquinas is not referring to either a vegetative or sensitive soul.
27. ST: Ia.76.7.ad 2. The relationship between the presence of a rational soul and a body's respiratory activity merits further discussion that I have space to provide here. Elucidating this relationship is important insofar as it bears on the role artificial means of life-support, such as mechanical ventilation or cardiopulmonary bypass machines, may have with respect to the metaphysical constitution of a human being dependent upon such means to continue respiring and circulating oxygenated blood.
28. I discuss this issue in: J.T. Eberl. Forthcoming. Thomistic Principles and Bioethics. Lisse. London: Routledge.
29. R. Veatch. 1988. Whole-Brain, Neocortical, and Higher Brain Related Concepts. In Death: Beyond Whole-Brain Criteria. R. Zaner, ed. Boston. Kluwer: 173.
30. Ibid. p. 173.
31. See ST: Ia.75.2; G. Klima. Aquinas' Proofs of the Immateriality of the Intellect from the Universality of Human Thought. Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 2001; 1: 19-28.
32. See ST: Ia.75.2; G. Klima. Aquinas' Proofs of the Immateriality of the Intellect from the Universality of Human Thought. Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 2001; 1: 19-28.
33. See J.T. Eberl. Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings. The Review of Metaphysics 2004; 58: 551-554.
34. See D.A. Shewmon. The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Persistent Vegetative State, and Dementia. The Thomist 1985; 49: 24-80. It should be noted that Shewmon no longer holds this position and now argues for a return to the circulatory/respiratory criterion for determining when death occurs. See note 55.
35. See D.A. Shewmon. The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Persistent Vegetative State, and Dementia. The Thomist 1985; 49: 24-80. It should be noted that Shewmon no longer holds this position and now argues for a return to the circulatory/respiratory criterion for determining when death occurs. See note 55.
36. See ST: Ia.76.3.ad 3, Ia.118.2.ad 2; QDA: XI.ad 1; SCG: II.89; QDSC: III.ad 13; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.9.ad 9; Compendium theologiae. 92.
37. See ST: Ia.76.3.ad 3, Ia.118.2.ad 2; QDA: XI.ad 1; SCG: II.89; QDSC: III.ad 13; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.9.ad 9; Compendium theologiae. 92.
38. See ST: Ia.76.3.ad 3, Ia.118.2.ad 2; QDA: XI.ad 1; SCG: II.89; QDSC: III.ad 13; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.9.ad 9; Compendium theologiae. 92.
39. See ST: Ia.76.3.ad 3, Ia.118.2.ad 2; QDA: XI.ad 1; SCG: II.89; QDSC: III.ad 13; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.9.ad 9; Compendium theologiae. 92.
40. See ST: Ia.76.3.ad 3, Ia.118.2.ad 2; QDA: XI.ad 1; SCG: II.89; QDSC: III.ad 13; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.9.ad 9; Compendium theologiae. 92.
41. See ST: Ia.76.3.ad 3, Ia.118.2.ad 2; QDA: XI.ad 1; SCG: II.89; QDSC: III.ad 13; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.9.ad 9; Compendium theologiae. 92.
42. The term 'mind' does not precisely correspond to Aquinas's term 'intellect' (intellectus). The mind includes certain capacities, such as the estimative capacity, that are distinct from the intellective capacity to understand universal concepts. Thus, the intellect is but one capacity of the mind. Contemporary philosophers, though, often understand the concept of mind in a fashion similar to Aquinas's concept of intellect and thus I propose the above substitution of terms.
43. See QDA: II; QDP: III.9.ad 22; ST: Ia.101.2; SCG: II.83.
44. See QDA: II; QDP: III.9.ad 22; ST: Ia.101.2; SCG: II.83.
45. See QDA: II; QDP: III.9.ad 22; ST: Ia.101.2; SCG: II.83.
46. See QDA: II; QDP: III.9.ad 22; ST: Ia.101.2; SCG: II.83.
47. The loss of higher-brain functioning does not preclude a rational soul's continuing to engage in rational activity, but this would require the soul to have separated from its body and thus for death to have occurred.
48. See Eberl, op. cit. note 25.
49. Shewmon, op. cit. note 26, p. 48.
50. Ibid. p. 61.
51. See E.-H. Kluge. St. Thomas, Abortion and Euthanasia: Another Look. Philosophy Research Archives 1981; 7: 312-344. For a similar argument, see: R. Pasnau. 2002. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. New York. Cambridge University Press: 124.
52. See E.-H. Kluge. St. Thomas, Abortion and Euthanasia: Another Look. Philosophy Research Archives 1981; 7: 312-344. For a similar argument, see: R. Pasnau. 2002. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature. New York. Cambridge University Press: 124.
53. Aquinas. In librum de causis expositio: I.
54. In DA: III.4.
55. Aquinas is here referring to accidental properties.
56. QDP: VIII.4.ad 12.
57. Aquinas. In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio: I.15.
58. ST: Ia.40.3.
59. Shewmon, op. cit. note 26, p. 51.
60. See ST: Ia.76.3-4; In DA: II.5; De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas: I.
61. See ST: Ia.76.3-4; In DA: II.5; De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas: I.
62. See ST: Ia.76.3-4; In DA: II.5; De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas: I.
63. See K. Andrews, L. Murphy, R. Munday & C. Littlewood. Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in a Rehabilitation Unit. British Medical Journal 1996; 313: 13-16; N.L. Childs, W.N. Mercer & H.W. Childs. Accuracy of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State. Neurology 1993; 43: 1465-1467.
64. See K. Andrews, L. Murphy, R. Munday & C. Littlewood. Misdiagnosis of the Vegetative State: Retrospective Study in a Rehabilitation Unit. British Medical Journal 1996; 313: 13-16; N.L. Childs, W.N. Mercer & H.W. Childs. Accuracy of Diagnosis of Persistent Vegetative State. Neurology 1993; 43: 1465-1467.
65. The story of Patricia White Bull was reported by The Associated Press and appeared, among other publications, in the Saint Louis Post Dispatch, January 5, 2000: A4. See J. Kavanaugh. 2001. Who Count as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of Killing. Washington, DC. Georgetown University Press: 68, note 25.
66. The story of Patricia White Bull was reported by The Associated Press and appeared, among other publications, in the Saint Louis Post Dispatch, January 5, 2000: A4. See J. Kavanaugh. 2001. Who Count as Persons? Human Identity and the Ethics of Killing. Washington, DC. Georgetown University Press: 68, note 25.
67. See ST: Ia.87.1.
68. See P. Smith. Personhood and the Persistent Vegetative State. Linacre Quarterly 1990; 57: 49-57; Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life: A Thomistic Exploration. The Thomist 1990; 54: 191-227; J.P. Moreland. Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die. Faith and Philosophy 1995; 12: 95-112; and S. Wallace. Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 1995; 35: 319-330; and S.B. Rae. 2000. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press: 316-337.
69. See P. Smith. Personhood and the Persistent Vegetative State. Linacre Quarterly 1990; 57: 49-57; Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life: A Thomistic Exploration. The Thomist 1990; 54: 191-227; J.P. Moreland. Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die. Faith and Philosophy 1995; 12: 95-112; and S. Wallace. Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 1995; 35: 319-330; and S.B. Rae. 2000. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press: 316-337.
70. See P. Smith. Personhood and the Persistent Vegetative State. Linacre Quarterly 1990; 57: 49-57; Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life: A Thomistic Exploration. The Thomist 1990; 54: 191-227; J.P. Moreland. Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die. Faith and Philosophy 1995; 12: 95-112; and S. Wallace. Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 1995; 35: 319-330; and S.B. Rae. 2000. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press: 316-337.
71. See P. Smith. Personhood and the Persistent Vegetative State. Linacre Quarterly 1990; 57: 49-57; Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life: A Thomistic Exploration. The Thomist 1990; 54: 191-227; J.P. Moreland. Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die. Faith and Philosophy 1995; 12: 95-112; and S. Wallace. Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 1995; 35: 319-330; and S.B. Rae. 2000. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press: 316-337.
72. See P. Smith. Personhood and the Persistent Vegetative State. Linacre Quarterly 1990; 57: 49-57; Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life: A Thomistic Exploration. The Thomist 1990; 54: 191-227; J.P. Moreland. Humanness, Personhood, and the Right to Die. Faith and Philosophy 1995; 12: 95-112; and S. Wallace. Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics. International Philosophical Quarterly 1995; 35: 319-330; and S.B. Rae. 2000. Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press: 316-337.
73. See J. Loeb. 1916. The Organism as a Whole. New York. Putnam.
74. J. Bernat. A Defense of the Whole-Brain Concept of Death. Hastings Center Report 1998; 28: 17, emphasis mine.
75. Ibid. p. 17, emphasis mine. Cf. 1999. Refinements in the Definition and Criterion of Death. In The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies. S. Youngner, R. Arnold & R. Shapiro, eds. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Press: 83-92.
76. Ibid. p. 17, emphasis mine. Cf. 1999. Refinements in the Definition and Criterion of Death. In The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies. S. Youngner, R. Arnold & R. Shapiro, eds. Baltimore. Johns Hopkins University Press: 83-92.
77. See P. Smith. Brain Death: A Thomistic Appraisal. Angelicum 1990; 67: 3-35.
78. See B. Ashley. Integrative Unity and the Human Soul. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2001; 1: 7-9; and K. O'Rourke. 1997. Health Care Ethics. Fourth edition. Washington, DC. Georgetown University Press: 316-337.
79. See B. Ashley. Integrative Unity and the Human Soul. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2001; 1: 7-9; and K. O'Rourke. 1997. Health Care Ethics. Fourth edition. Washington, DC. Georgetown University Press: 316-337.
80. White et al., op. cit. note 3, p. 81.
81. Smith, op. cit. note 50, pp. 24-25. Cf. Ashley, op. cit. note 51, p. 8.
82. Smith, op. cit. note 50, pp. 24-25. Cf. Ashley, op. cit. note 51, p. 8.
83. Ashley, op. cit. note 51, pp. 7-8.
84. D.A. Shewmon. 'Brain Death': A Valid Theme with Invalid Variations, Blurred by Semantic Ambiguity. In White et al., op. cit. note 3, p. 31. In this article, Shewmon retracts his previous advocacy of higher-brain death. Shewmon has since altered his position again to argue for a return to a criterion for determining death in terms of the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory activity; see D.A. Shewmon. The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating 'Brain Death' With Death. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2001; 26: 457-478; 'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Equivalence. Issues in Law and Medicine 1998; 14: 125-145; Recovery from 'Brain Death': A Neurologist's Apologia. Linacre Quarterly 1997; 64: 30-96.
85. D.A. Shewmon. 'Brain Death': A Valid Theme with Invalid Variations, Blurred by Semantic Ambiguity. In White et al., op. cit. note 3, p. 31. In this article, Shewmon retracts his previous advocacy of higher-brain death. Shewmon has since altered his position again to argue for a return to a criterion for determining death in terms of the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory activity; see D.A. Shewmon. The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating 'Brain Death' With Death. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2001; 26: 457-478; 'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Equivalence. Issues in Law and Medicine 1998; 14: 125-145; Recovery from 'Brain Death': A Neurologist's Apologia. Linacre Quarterly 1997; 64: 30-96.
86. D.A. Shewmon. 'Brain Death': A Valid Theme with Invalid Variations, Blurred by Semantic Ambiguity. In White et al., op. cit. note 3, p. 31. In this article, Shewmon retracts his previous advocacy of higher-brain death. Shewmon has since altered his position again to argue for a return to a criterion for determining death in terms of the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory activity; see D.A. Shewmon. The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating 'Brain Death' With Death. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2001; 26: 457-478; 'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Equivalence. Issues in Law and Medicine 1998; 14: 125-145; Recovery from 'Brain Death': A Neurologist's Apologia. Linacre Quarterly 1997; 64: 30-96.
87. D.A. Shewmon. 'Brain Death': A Valid Theme with Invalid Variations, Blurred by Semantic Ambiguity. In White et al., op. cit. note 3, p. 31. In this article, Shewmon retracts his previous advocacy of higher-brain death. Shewmon has since altered his position again to argue for a return to a criterion for determining death in terms of the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory activity; see D.A. Shewmon. The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating 'Brain Death' With Death. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2001; 26: 457-478; 'Brainstem Death,' 'Brain Death' and Death: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Purported Equivalence. Issues in Law and Medicine 1998; 14: 125-145; Recovery from 'Brain Death': A Neurologist's Apologia. Linacre Quarterly 1997; 64: 30-96.
88. This distinction is, of course, favoured by advocates of higher-brain death. See J. Rachels. 1986. The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality. New York. Oxford University Press: 5-6, 24-27.
89. See Ashley, op. cit. note 51, p. 8.
90. See Bernat, op. cit. note 48, p. 18.
91. The term 'whole-brain functioning' does not refer to the functioning of every part of the brain, but of the set of critical neural systems - defined by Bernat - present in the cerebral cortex, cerebellum, and brainstem that constitute the brain's role as an 'integrator' for its body. All three components must be irreversibly non-functional in order for the brain as a whole, and thus the human being, to be considered dead. However, there is general recognition that random electrical activity may persist in a brain that is nonetheless dead.
92. See Ashley, op. cit. note 51, p. 9; C. Manni. 1999. A Report on Cerebral Death. In The Dignity of the Dying Person: Proceedings of the Fifth Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life. J. de Dios Vial Correa & E. Sgreccia, eds. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana: 106.
93. See Ashley, op. cit. note 51, p. 9; C. Manni. 1999. A Report on Cerebral Death. In The Dignity of the Dying Person: Proceedings of the Fifth Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life. J. de Dios Vial Correa & E. Sgreccia, eds. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana: 106.
94. See J.T. Eberl. The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 2000; 74: 215-230.
95. M. Lock. 1999. The Problem of Brain Death: Japanese Disputes about Bodies and Modernity. In Youngner et al., op. cit. note 49, p. 239; R. Kimura. Japan's Dilemma with the Definition of Death. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991; 1: 123-131.
96. M. Lock. 1999. The Problem of Brain Death: Japanese Disputes about Bodies and Modernity. In Youngner et al., op. cit. note 49, p. 239; R. Kimura. Japan's Dilemma with the Definition of Death. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991; 1: 123-131.
97. M. Lock. 1999. The Problem of Brain Death: Japanese Disputes about Bodies and Modernity. In Youngner et al., op. cit. note 49, p. 239; R. Kimura. Japan's Dilemma with the Definition of Death. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1991; 1: 123-131.
98. See Genesis 2:7.
99. See F. Rosner. 1999. The Definition of Death in Jewish Law. In Youngner et al., op. cit. note 49, pp. 210-221.
100. See the New Jersey Declaration of Death Act (N.J.S.A. 26:6A-Iet seq.), April 8, 1991.
101. R. Veatch. 1999. The Conscience Clause: How Much Individual Choice in Defining Death Can Our Society Tolerate? In Youngner et al., op. cit. note 49, pp. 137-160.
102. See Eberl, op. cit. note 25.