Substantial identity and the right to life: A rejoinder to Dean Stretton

Bioethics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 93-97

  Lee, Patrick ^a  

^a FRANCISCAN UNIVERSITY OF STEUBENVILLE   (United States)

Author keywords

Accidental property; Developed capacity; Embryo; Natural capacity; Substance

Indexed keywords

ABORTION; ARTICLE; BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; IDENTITY; LIFE; RIGHT TO LIFE;

BIOETHICAL ISSUES; EMBRYO; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; PERSONHOOD; VALUE OF LIFE;

EID: 33846031563     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00529.x     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Patrick Lee. The Pro-Life Argument form Substantial Identity: A Defence. Bioethics 2004; 18(3): 249-263.
2. Dean Stretton. Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee. Bioethics 2004; 18(3): 264-282.
3. Also see Patrick Lee. 1996. Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press;
4. Dean Stretton. The Argument from Intrinsic Value: A Critique. Bioethics 2000; 14(3): 228-239.
5. Ibid: Stretton, 274-275.
6. Ibid: 275.
7. Ibid: 276.
8. Michael Tooley. 1983. Abortion and Infanticide. New York: Oxford University Press: 117.
9. Lee 1996, op. cit. note 1, ch. 1.
10. For example, D. Alan Shewmon. The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating 'Brain Death' with Death. J Med Philos 2001; 26: 457-478.
11. Lee, 2004, op. cit. note 1, pp. 255-256.
12. Ibid: Stretton, 279.
13. Ibid: Stretton, 279.
14. Or at least dispose toward the creation of a new substance by a higher power. See the penultimate paragraph of this article. Joel Wallman. 1992. Aping Language. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. Stretton, op. cit. note 1, p. 280.
16. Jeff McMahon. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York: Oxford University Press: 24-25, 316.
17. Ibid.
18. Wallman, op. cit. note 10.
19. Lee, op. cit. note 1.
20. Ibid: Stretton, 267.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid: Stretton, 267, note 10.
23. Ibid: Stretton, 268.
24. Don Marquis's future-like-ours criterion (which does not have a psychological continuity requirement) does not fall under this criticism (namely, negating the reversibly comatose's right to life). However, if having-a-future-like-ours is an accidental property, then it does face the other difficulties I have presented against accidental attributes criteria.
25. This is an intrinsic right-conferring property in each human individual, not just in the paradigm instances of humans.
26. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 254.
27. Ibid: 256.
28. There is not space here to defend this point. See, however, John Haldane. 2000. The Source and Destination of Thought. In Referring to God, Jewish and Christian Philosophical and Theological Perspectives. Paul Helm, ed. New York: St. Martin's Press;
29. Russell Pannier & Thomas D. Sullivan. 2000. The Mind-Marker. In Theos, Anthropos: A Compendium of Philosophical Theology. Roy Abraham Varghese, ed. New York: P. Lang.
30. For a defense of this position, see Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Body-Self Dualism and Contemporary Ethical and Political Issues, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.