Essential properties and the right to life: A response to Lee

Bioethics

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 264-282

  Stretton, Dean ^a  

^a NONE   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMA; CONCEPTION; DECISION MAKING; ETHICS; HUMAN; HUMAN RIGHTS; IDENTITY; MENTAL FUNCTION; REVIEW;

EID: 2942560808     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x     Document Type: Review

References (92)

1. P. Lee. The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence. Bioethics 2004; 18: 249-263, at 250. My numbering differs from Lee's. The 'are' in (1) is the 'are' of identity: we are each (identical to) a particular human organism. An essential property of a being is a property the being could not possibly lack - so that, necessarily, if the being exists at all then it has that property. An accidental property is one that is not essential.
2. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
3. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
4. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
5. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
6. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
7. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
8. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
9. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
10. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
11. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
12. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
13. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
14. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
15. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
16. Ibid. p. 250. I call this the 'natural capacities' view. Others defend it too; see: F. Beckwith. 1993. Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights. Grand Rapids, MI. Baker: 108-110. T. Chappell. 1998. Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press: 127-134. J. Finnis. 1999. Abortion and Health Care Ethics. Reprinted in Bioethics: An Anthology. H. Kuhse & P. Singer, eds. Oxford. Blackwell: 13-20, at 13-15. R. George. Statement of Professor George (Joined by Dr. Gómez-Lobo). In President's Council on Bioethics. July 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry. http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/ appendix.html#george. G. Grisez. 1970. Abortion: the Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments. New York. Corpus Books: 277-287. S. Klusendorf. 2002. Pro-Life 101: A Step-by-Step Guide to Making Your Case Persuasively. Signal Hill, CA. Stand to Reason Press: 31-32. R. Joyce. Personhood and the Conception Event. The New Scholasticism 1978; 52: 97-109, at 98-99. P. Kreeft. Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Journal of Biblical Ethics in Medicine 1990; 4: 9-17, at 14. P. Kreeft. 2002. Three Approaches to Abortion. San Francisco. Ignatius: 96-97. A. Ray. Humanity, Personhood, and Abortion. International Philosophical Quarterly 1985; 25: 233-245, at 239-241. M. Reichlin. The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23, at 22-23. S. Schwarz. 1990. The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago. Loyola University Press: 91-93. S. Schwarz & R. Tacelli. Abortion and Some Philosophers: A Critical Examination. Public Affairs Quarterly 1989; 3: 81-98, at 93.
17. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 253.
18. If (1) is false, (3) becomes more plausible. For example, suppose - contrary to (1) - that we are essentially persons in the descriptive sense: rational, self-conscious beings (as opposed to human organisms). Since rationality and self-consciousness plausibly confer a right to life, it would follow that we have a right to life essentially - in which case (3) is true. But any warrant for (3) will, I claim, derive from a denial of (1). Thus there cannot, as Lee's argument requires, be warrant for (1) and (3).
19. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 252, his emphasis. The reversibly comatose, I take it, are those who are presently comatose but who will (barring further injury or premature death) return to normal mental functioning.
20. Ibid. p. 263, note 29, my emphasis.
21. Ibid. p. 263. Lee then asserts: 'Only this ['natural capacities'] position is consistent with the recognition that the actions of a thing (such as conceptual thought and free choice) flow from the kind of thing it is, its nature, rather than vice versa.' This is false. One can consistently hold a thing's nature explains its actions without holding that its nature confers a right to life.
22. John Harris, for example, holds that those with a right to life are those who have gained, and not irreversibly lost, the capacity to value their own lives (a form of higher mental function): J. Harris. 1985. The Value of Life. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul: 25-27. Cf. M. Warren. 1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford. Clarendon Press: 206. C. Tauer. Personhood and Human Embryos and Fetuses. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985; 10: 253-266, at 259-262.
23. John Harris, for example, holds that those with a right to life are those who have gained, and not irreversibly lost, the capacity to value their own lives (a form of higher mental function): J. Harris. 1985. The Value of Life. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul: 25-27. Cf. M. Warren. 1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford. Clarendon Press: 206. C. Tauer. Personhood and Human Embryos and Fetuses. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985; 10: 253-266, at 259-262.
24. John Harris, for example, holds that those with a right to life are those who have gained, and not irreversibly lost, the capacity to value their own lives (a form of higher mental function): J. Harris. 1985. The Value of Life. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul: 25-27. Cf. M. Warren. 1997. Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford. Clarendon Press: 206. C. Tauer. Personhood and Human Embryos and Fetuses. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1985; 10: 253-266, at 259-262.
25. Cf. E. Kluge. 1975. The Practice of Death. New Haven. Yale University Press: 92-95. Condition (ii) is vague, of course: there will be borderline cases where there is no fact of the matter (or no knowable fact) as to whether X retains 'substantially all' the relevant structures. But this is not necessarily a weakness, since virtually all interesting concepts do leave borderline cases.
26. Pro-choicers have often noted that so-called 'dispositional' (as opposed to 'occurrent') mental states continue to exist while one is unconscious. See: D. Boonin. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 64-70. P. Singer. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. New York. Cambridge University Press: 98-99. J. Glover. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. London. Penguin: 77. Also Cf.: H. Engelhardt. 1996. The Foundations of Bioethics. Second edition. New York. Oxford University Press: 151-154.
27. Pro-choicers have often noted that so-called 'dispositional' (as opposed to 'occurrent') mental states continue to exist while one is unconscious. See: D. Boonin. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 64-70. P. Singer. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. New York. Cambridge University Press: 98-99. J. Glover. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. London. Penguin: 77. Also Cf.: H. Engelhardt. 1996. The Foundations of Bioethics. Second edition. New York. Oxford University Press: 151-154.
28. Pro-choicers have often noted that so-called 'dispositional' (as opposed to 'occurrent') mental states continue to exist while one is unconscious. See: D. Boonin. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 64-70. P. Singer. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. New York. Cambridge University Press: 98-99. J. Glover. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. London. Penguin: 77. Also Cf.: H. Engelhardt. 1996. The Foundations of Bioethics. Second edition. New York. Oxford University Press: 151-154.
29. Pro-choicers have often noted that so-called 'dispositional' (as opposed to 'occurrent') mental states continue to exist while one is unconscious. See: D. Boonin. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 64-70. P. Singer. 1993. Practical Ethics. Second edition. New York. Cambridge University Press: 98-99. J. Glover. 1977. Causing Death and Saving Lives. London. Penguin: 77. Also Cf.: H. Engelhardt. 1996. The Foundations of Bioethics. Second edition. New York. Oxford University Press: 151-154.
30. Cf. Harris, op. cit. note 8, Chapter 1.
31. Cf. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 94-95. P. Singer. 1994. Rethinking Life and Death. Melbourne. Text Publishing: 197-198. P. Singer & H. Kuhse. 1985. Should the Baby Live? Oxford. Oxford University Press: 120, 131-132.
32. Cf. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 94-95. P. Singer. 1994. Rethinking Life and Death. Melbourne. Text Publishing: 197-198. P. Singer & H. Kuhse. 1985. Should the Baby Live? Oxford. Oxford University Press: 120, 131-132.
33. Cf. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 94-95. P. Singer. 1994. Rethinking Life and Death. Melbourne. Text Publishing: 197-198. P. Singer & H. Kuhse. 1985. Should the Baby Live? Oxford. Oxford University Press: 120, 131-132.
34. Cf. M. Tooley. Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1972; 2: 37-65, at 49. M. Tooley. Correspondence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1973; 2: 419-432, at 424-425. Glover, op. cit. note 10, Chapters 4-5. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 95-99.
35. Cf. M. Tooley. Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1972; 2: 37-65, at 49. M. Tooley. Correspondence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1973; 2: 419-432, at 424-425. Glover, op. cit. note 10, Chapters 4-5. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 95-99.
36. Cf. M. Tooley. Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1972; 2: 37-65, at 49. M. Tooley. Correspondence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1973; 2: 419-432, at 424-425. Glover, op. cit. note 10, Chapters 4-5. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 95-99.
37. Cf. M. Tooley. Abortion and Infanticide. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1972; 2: 37-65, at 49. M. Tooley. Correspondence. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1973; 2: 419-432, at 424-425. Glover, op. cit. note 10, Chapters 4-5. Singer, op. cit. note 10, pp. 95-99.
38. Boonin, op. cit. note 10, pp. 70-85. A being has an 'ideal desire' for continued life if and only if either (i) the being has an actual desire (whether occurrent or dispositional) for continued life, and this desire was not formed under distorting conditions such as lack of information, duress, or emotional instability; or (ii) the being has some actual desire which was formed under distorting conditions and, had it been formed under more ideal conditions, would either be or would include a desire for continued life. (Thanks to David Boonin [personal correspondence] for clarification on this point.) On Boonin's view, an ideal desire for continued life confers a right to life only if that continued life is sufficiently valuable.
39. Cf. Tauer, op. cit. note 8, p. 259.
40. The phrase is from: D. Marquis. Why Abortion Is Immoral. Journal of Philosophy 1989; 86: 183-202, at 192. On Marquis's pro-life view, the right to life is conferred by the (accidental) property of having a highly valuable future. This becomes a pro-choice view if one adds the requirement that there be some psychological relation (such as resemblance or connectedness) between the being as it is now and the being as it will be upon living out the valuable future. Reasons for adding this requirement are given in: D. Stretton. The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion. Bioethics 2004; 18: 144-180. While I do not think that having a highly valuable future (psychologically connected or otherwise) is what confers a right to life, this is at least a plausible view.
41. The phrase is from: D. Marquis. Why Abortion Is Immoral. Journal of Philosophy 1989; 86: 183-202, at 192. On Marquis's pro-life view, the right to life is conferred by the (accidental) property of having a highly valuable future. This becomes a pro-choice view if one adds the requirement that there be some psychological relation (such as resemblance or connectedness) between the being as it is now and the being as it will be upon living out the valuable future. Reasons for adding this requirement are given in: D. Stretton. The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion. Bioethics 2004; 18: 144-180. While I do not think that having a highly valuable future (psychologically connected or otherwise) is what confers a right to life, this is at least a plausible view.
42. Combinations of these views are also possible: one might, for example, think a right to life is conferred by the disjunctive property of desiring continued life and/or having a highly valuable future to which one is at least moderately psychologically connected.
43. I use 'human beings' and 'humans' to mean 'individual organisms of the species Homo sapiens.'
44. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 254, his emphasis.
45. See: S. Jones, R. Martin & D. Pilbeam, eds. 1992. The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 111, 138-141. Singer, op. cit. note 12, pp. 159-163, 181-182. If one is not convinced by this evidence, just imagine a species whose members both (a) are rational and self-conscious to a lesser degree than normal human beings, and (b) would lack a right to life according to proponents of the 'natural capacities' view.
46. See: S. Jones, R. Martin & D. Pilbeam, eds. 1992. The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press: 111, 138-141. Singer, op. cit. note 12, pp. 159-163, 181-182. If one is not convinced by this evidence, just imagine a species whose members both (a) are rational and self-conscious to a lesser degree than normal human beings, and (b) would lack a right to life according to proponents of the 'natural capacities' view.
47. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 254.
48. Ibid. p. 249 (Abstract).
49. Ibid. p. 255. The same argument is given by Kreeft (op. cit. note 2, p. 15), Schwarz (op. cit. note 2, pp. 105-109), and Schwarz and Tacelli (op. cit. note 2, p. 90). These writers further charge (though Lee does not) that the pro-choice position is arbitrary because it is impossible non-arbitrarily to specify which higher mental functions - which among conceptual thought, rationality, self-consciousness, communication, and so on - are necessary for a right to life. But this too is self-defeating. For these writers, like Lee, hold the right to life is conferred by a natural capacity for 'personal acts' (higher mental functions); and so they equally face the problem of specifying which personal acts one must have a natural capacity for, in order to have a right to life.
50. I assume one's IQ is a rough indicator of one's developed capacity for higher mental functions. If one disagrees, take 'IQ' to refer to a more accurate system of measuring that capacity.
51. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 249 (Abstract).
52. Ibid. pp. 254-255.
53. Ibid. p. 263.
54. Ibid. p. 255, my emphasis.
55. See: S. Coren. 1995. The Intelligence of Dogs. New York. Bantam: 182-183.
56. '[A] bout 95 percent of the population has IQ scores between 70 and 130', such scores being 'reasonable indices' of GCA: R. Plomin, J. Defries, G. McClearn & P. McGuffin, eds. 2001. Behavioral Genetics. Fourth edition. New York. Worth: 132 and 156 respectively. Given the size of the human population, however, many individuals have an IQ substantially above 130. (Note that IQ measures GCA, and GCA is the same thing, or virtually the same thing as one's developed capacity for higher mental functions.)
57. That is, the 'heritability' of GCA is about 50%. See: Ibid. pp. 172-173 (and Chapter 9 generally). S. Pinker. 2002. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. London. Allen Lane: 374-375. P. Thompson, T. Cannon, K. Narr, T. van Erp, V. Poutanen, M. Huttunen, J. Lönnqvist, C. Standertskjö ld-Nordenstam, J. Kaprio, M. Khaledy, R. Dail, C. Zoumalan & A. Toga. Genetic Influences on Brain Structure. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1253-1258. R. Plomin. Genes, Brain and Cognition. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1153-1154 (discussing Thompson et al). Thanks also to Robert Plomin (personal communication) for discussion on this point.
58. That is, the 'heritability' of GCA is about 50%. See: Ibid. pp. 172-173 (and Chapter 9 generally). S. Pinker. 2002. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. London. Allen Lane: 374-375. P. Thompson, T. Cannon, K. Narr, T. van Erp, V. Poutanen, M. Huttunen, J. Lönnqvist, C. Standertskjö ld-Nordenstam, J. Kaprio, M. Khaledy, R. Dail, C. Zoumalan & A. Toga. Genetic Influences on Brain Structure. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1253-1258. R. Plomin. Genes, Brain and Cognition. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1153-1154 (discussing Thompson et al). Thanks also to Robert Plomin (personal communication) for discussion on this point.
59. That is, the 'heritability' of GCA is about 50%. See: Ibid. pp. 172-173 (and Chapter 9 generally). S. Pinker. 2002. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. London. Allen Lane: 374-375. P. Thompson, T. Cannon, K. Narr, T. van Erp, V. Poutanen, M. Huttunen, J. Lönnqvist, C. Standertskjö ld-Nordenstam, J. Kaprio, M. Khaledy, R. Dail, C. Zoumalan & A. Toga. Genetic Influences on Brain Structure. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1253-1258. R. Plomin. Genes, Brain and Cognition. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1153-1154 (discussing Thompson et al). Thanks also to Robert Plomin (personal communication) for discussion on this point.
60. That is, the 'heritability' of GCA is about 50%. See: Ibid. pp. 172-173 (and Chapter 9 generally). S. Pinker. 2002. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. London. Allen Lane: 374-375. P. Thompson, T. Cannon, K. Narr, T. van Erp, V. Poutanen, M. Huttunen, J. Lönnqvist, C. Standertskjö ld-Nordenstam, J. Kaprio, M. Khaledy, R. Dail, C. Zoumalan & A. Toga. Genetic Influences on Brain Structure. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1253-1258. R. Plomin. Genes, Brain and Cognition. Nature Neuroscience 2001; 4: 1153-1154 (discussing Thompson et al). Thanks also to Robert Plomin (personal communication) for discussion on this point.
61. Moreover if, as Lee holds, those who will naturally develop a certain level of higher mental functions thereby have a right to life, why would it not be the case that those who will naturally possess that level of higher mental functions for a longer period (say, through having a naturally longer life span) would have more of a right to life?
62. Lee could also avoid the inequality by holding that the right to life arises from being a member of a species whose normal members have a natural capacity for (at least) a particular level of higher mental functions. Three problems with this move: (1) A being's right to life can hardly arise primarily from facts about the capacities of other beings. (2) Assuming 'normal' means 'statistically normal' (I do not see what else it could mean), implausible results follow. Suppose an asteroid hits Earth and destroys everyone except me and several humans whose natural capacities are comparable to those of dogs. 'Normal' members of my species would now lack natural capacities for the requisite level of higher mental functions; hence I would now lack a right to life (which is absurd, and in any case entails I have a right to life accidentally). See also: J. McMahan. 2002. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York. Oxford University Press: 214-217. (3) The 'normal members' view still faces the problem of the right to life existing in degrees between species (rather than within species).
63. Not all of the following arguments strictly assume we are essentially human organisms; but they are more plausible (have greater force) on that assumption.
64. 'Not a whole lot is essential to me: my identity, my kind, my origins, consequences of these, and that is pretty much it ... I have by contrast huge numbers of accidental properties ... Almost any property one would ordinarily think of is a property I could have existed without': S. Yablo. Abstract Objects: A Case Study. Philosophical Issues: Realism and Relativism 2002; 12: 220-240, at 220, his emphasis.
65. J. McMahan. Killing and Equality. Utilitas 1995; 7: 1-29, at 25.
66. That is: given our assumption that we are essentially human organisms, our background knowledge creates a presumption that substantial respect is not owed in virtue of essential properties. Note, however, that if we were essentially rational and self-conscious persons (as opposed to human organisms), then the presumption would not apply; for substantial respect plausibly would be owed to us in virtue of our essential properties (namely, our essential possession of rationality and self-consciousness).
67. Cf. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 253. I have a counter-query. The fact that a being has a 'basic' or 'natural' capacity for higher mental functions isjust the fact that, under appropriate conditions, the being would of its own accord develop such functions. Yet why should the mere fact that a being would under appropriate conditions develop higher mental functions give it a right to life, if those conditions do not in fact obtain?
68. If the killing violates desires the patient held in the past (say, a desire to be kept alive as long as possible), or violates the desire of relatives that the patient be kept alive, then the killing may still be harmful (to the patient or relatives) and therefore wrong. Also, one might claim that killing an irreversibly comatose patient who had a past desire to be kept alive along as possible would, in a relevant sense, violate his autonomy, and so might be as wrong as murder. I disagree; but we can suppose for simplicity that the patient had no such past desire. With this amendment, the patient plainly does (as most will grant) lack a right to life.
69. P. Lee. 1996. Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, DC. Catholic University of America Press: 77.
70. Singer, op. cit. note 12, p. 11.
71. Ibid. Chapter 1. R. Truog & J. Fletcher. Brain Death and the Anencephalic Newborn. Bioethics 1990; 4: 199-215, at 207.
72. Ibid. Chapter 1. R. Truog & J. Fletcher. Brain Death and the Anencephalic Newborn. Bioethics 1990; 4: 199-215, at 207.
73. J. McMahan. 1995. The Metaphysics of Brain Death. Bioethics 1995; 9: 91-126, at 96.
74. If, as is at least plausible, we survive death as corpses, Lee's view absurdly implies that the dead have a right to life. See: F. Feldman. 1992. Confrontations with the Reaper. New York. Oxford University Press: 89-105. D. Mackie. Personal Identity and Dead People. Philosophical Studies 1999; 95: 219-242. W. Carter. Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1999; 59: 167-172.
75. If, as is at least plausible, we survive death as corpses, Lee's view absurdly implies that the dead have a right to life. See: F. Feldman. 1992. Confrontations with the Reaper. New York. Oxford University Press: 89-105. D. Mackie. Personal Identity and Dead People. Philosophical Studies 1999; 95: 219-242. W. Carter. Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1999; 59: 167-172.
76. If, as is at least plausible, we survive death as corpses, Lee's view absurdly implies that the dead have a right to life. See: F. Feldman. 1992. Confrontations with the Reaper. New York. Oxford University Press: 89-105. D. Mackie. Personal Identity and Dead People. Philosophical Studies 1999; 95: 219-242. W. Carter. Will I Be a Dead Person? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1999; 59: 167-172.
77. Lee, op. cit. note 1, pp. 255-256.
78. Let A = the human organism on the operating table before cerebrum removal, B = the human organism on the operating table after cerebrum removal, C = the organism resulting from the transplant (with human cerebrum). If A = B, then, since B ≠ C, therefore A ≠ C; but this contradicts view (ii), on which A = C. So view (ii) must claim A ≠ B: that is, merely removing A's cerebrum creates a new organism, B (which did not exist prior to cerebrum removal). One could avoid this implication by holding that what is left behind when we remove a human organism's (such as A's) cerebrum is not an organism at all but a mere collection of matter, the remains of an organism. This perhaps would be plausible if we were removing the whole brain, not just the cerebrum. See: P. van Inwagen. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca. Cornell University Press: Chapter 15. E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York. Oxford University Press: 45. Cf. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 257. But even on this sort of view, a human organism can continue to exist in an irreversible coma, so long as the organism retains sufficient capacity for self-organisation: Material Beings, pp. 179-180; The Human Animal, p. 17. This capacity is plainly retained when we remove a human organism's cerebrum: the brain-stem is still intact and functioning, which suffices (though on my view is not necessary) to ensure the organism regulates its own reflex and metabolic functions - breathing, circulation, digestion, and so on. Hence what is left behind, when we remove a human organism's cerebrum, is still a human organism. So view (ii) must indeed claim - implausibly - that A ≠ B.
79. Let A = the human organism on the operating table before cerebrum removal, B = the human organism on the operating table after cerebrum removal, C = the organism resulting from the transplant (with human cerebrum). If A = B, then, since B ≠ C, therefore A ≠ C; but this contradicts view (ii), on which A = C. So view (ii) must claim A ≠ B: that is, merely removing A's cerebrum creates a new organism, B (which did not exist prior to cerebrum removal). One could avoid this implication by holding that what is left behind when we remove a human organism's (such as A's) cerebrum is not an organism at all but a mere collection of matter, the remains of an organism. This perhaps would be plausible if we were removing the whole brain, not just the cerebrum. See: P. van Inwagen. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca. Cornell University Press: Chapter 15. E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York. Oxford University Press: 45. Cf. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 257. But even on this sort of view, a human organism can continue to exist in an irreversible coma, so long as the organism retains sufficient capacity for self-organisation: Material Beings, pp. 179-180; The Human Animal, p. 17. This capacity is plainly retained when we remove a human organism's cerebrum: the brain-stem is still intact and functioning, which suffices (though on my view is not necessary) to ensure the organism regulates its own reflex and metabolic functions - breathing, circulation, digestion, and so on. Hence what is left behind, when we remove a human organism's cerebrum, is still a human organism. So view (ii) must indeed claim - implausibly - that A ≠ B.
80. Let A = the human organism on the operating table before cerebrum removal, B = the human organism on the operating table after cerebrum removal, C = the organism resulting from the transplant (with human cerebrum). If A = B, then, since B ≠ C, therefore A ≠ C; but this contradicts view (ii), on which A = C. So view (ii) must claim A ≠ B: that is, merely removing A's cerebrum creates a new organism, B (which did not exist prior to cerebrum removal). One could avoid this implication by holding that what is left behind when we remove a human organism's (such as A's) cerebrum is not an organism at all but a mere collection of matter, the remains of an organism. This perhaps would be plausible if we were removing the whole brain, not just the cerebrum. See: P. van Inwagen. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca. Cornell University Press: Chapter 15. E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York. Oxford University Press: 45. Cf. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 257. But even on this sort of view, a human organism can continue to exist in an irreversible coma, so long as the organism retains sufficient capacity for self-organisation: Material Beings, pp. 179-180; The Human Animal, p. 17. This capacity is plainly retained when we remove a human organism's cerebrum: the brain-stem is still intact and functioning, which suffices (though on my view is not necessary) to ensure the organism regulates its own reflex and metabolic functions - breathing, circulation, digestion, and so on. Hence what is left behind, when we remove a human organism's cerebrum, is still a human organism. So view (ii) must indeed claim - implausibly - that A ≠ B.
81. Let A = the human organism on the operating table before cerebrum removal, B = the human organism on the operating table after cerebrum removal, C = the organism resulting from the transplant (with human cerebrum). If A = B, then, since B ≠ C, therefore A ≠ C; but this contradicts view (ii), on which A = C. So view (ii) must claim A ≠ B: that is, merely removing A's cerebrum creates a new organism, B (which did not exist prior to cerebrum removal). One could avoid this implication by holding that what is left behind when we remove a human organism's (such as A's) cerebrum is not an organism at all but a mere collection of matter, the remains of an organism. This perhaps would be plausible if we were removing the whole brain, not just the cerebrum. See: P. van Inwagen. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca. Cornell University Press: Chapter 15. E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York. Oxford University Press: 45. Cf. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 257. But even on this sort of view, a human organism can continue to exist in an irreversible coma, so long as the organism retains sufficient capacity for self-organisation: Material Beings, pp. 179-180; The Human Animal, p. 17. This capacity is plainly retained when we remove a human organism's cerebrum: the brain-stem is still intact and functioning, which suffices (though on my view is not necessary) to ensure the organism regulates its own reflex and metabolic functions - breathing, circulation, digestion, and so on. Hence what is left behind, when we remove a human organism's cerebrum, is still a human organism. So view (ii) must indeed claim - implausibly - that A ≠ B.
82. Let A = the human organism on the operating table before cerebrum removal, B = the human organism on the operating table after cerebrum removal, C = the organism resulting from the transplant (with human cerebrum). If A = B, then, since B ≠ C, therefore A ≠ C; but this contradicts view (ii), on which A = C. So view (ii) must claim A ≠ B: that is, merely removing A's cerebrum creates a new organism, B (which did not exist prior to cerebrum removal). One could avoid this implication by holding that what is left behind when we remove a human organism's (such as A's) cerebrum is not an organism at all but a mere collection of matter, the remains of an organism. This perhaps would be plausible if we were removing the whole brain, not just the cerebrum. See: P. van Inwagen. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca. Cornell University Press: Chapter 15. E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York. Oxford University Press: 45. Cf. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 257. But even on this sort of view, a human organism can continue to exist in an irreversible coma, so long as the organism retains sufficient capacity for self-organisation: Material Beings, pp. 179-180; The Human Animal, p. 17. This capacity is plainly retained when we remove a human organism's cerebrum: the brain-stem is still intact and functioning, which suffices (though on my view is not necessary) to ensure the organism regulates its own reflex and metabolic functions - breathing, circulation, digestion, and so on. Hence what is left behind, when we remove a human organism's cerebrum, is still a human organism. So view (ii) must indeed claim - implausibly - that A ≠ B.
83. Lee, op. cit. note 1, p. 256.
84. Lee notes that '[m] ost discussions of "cerebrum transplants" do not envisage transplanting into a nonhuman animal' (ibid. p. 256, note 17, his emphasis). Perhaps he is urging us to agree that combining parts from human and non-human organisms plausibly creates, as view (iii) claims, an entirely new being. This indeed would be plausible if we were combining many non-human and many human parts. But we are in fact combining many non-human parts - everything except the cerebrum - with just one (relatively small) human part, the cerebrum. It is no more plausible to suppose this creates an entirely new being than it is to suppose that transplanting a human liver into a non-human organism (with the liver integrating perfectly) creates an entirely new being.
85. Cf. J. Stone. Why Potentiality Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1987; 17: 815-830, at 818-819.
86. McMahan, op. cit. note 36, pp. 24-25. McMahan, op. cit. note 33, p. 316. Cf. R. Wertheimer. Understanding the Abortion Argument. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1971; 1: 67-95, at 93.
87. McMahan, op. cit. note 36, pp. 24-25. McMahan, op. cit. note 33, p. 316. Cf. R. Wertheimer. Understanding the Abortion Argument. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1971; 1: 67-95, at 93.
88. McMahan, op. cit. note 36, pp. 24-25. McMahan, op. cit. note 33, p. 316. Cf. R. Wertheimer. Understanding the Abortion Argument. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1971; 1: 67-95, at 93.
89. Lee must, I think, assert either of these claims. Yet note how similar they are to the implausible position (which he rightly rejects: op. cit. note 1, pp. 258-259) that when an organism acquires 'the immediately exercisable capacity to think', it is then and there replaced by a new organism.
90. Arguments 4 and 5 show that having a natural capacity for higher mental functions is not necessary for a right to life (from which it follows that the right to life is an accidental property of at least some of those that possess it). Lee might retreat to the weaker claim that this capacity is nevertheless sufficient for a right to life. Thus, he could say, the non-human organisms in arguments 4 and 5 have a right to life accidentally, but humans (who essentially have a natural capacity for higher mental functions) have a right to life essentially. This will not do, however. First, the claim that our natural capacity is even sufficient for a right to life could only be supported via claims such as (a)-(d), which (as I have argued) are self-defeating. Second, arguments 1-3 show our natural capacity is not sufficient for a right to life.
91. For tentative suggestions, see McMahan, op. cit. note 33, pp. 260-265.
92. For helpful comments, I am grateful to Jeff McMahan, an anonymous Bioethics referee, and members of the ANU Philosophy Society. Special thanks to Mitsuru Murai.