Problem structure, institutional design, and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements

Global Environmental Politics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 72-89

  Mitchell, Ronald B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENDOGENOUS CUE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT;

EID: 33748758497     PISSN: 15263800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/glep.2006.6.3.72     Document Type: Review

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