Political constitutionalism: A republican defence of the constitutionality of democracy

Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-270

  Bellamy, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84927004175     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511490187     Document Type: Book

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