Dynamics to equilibrium in network games: Individual behavior and global response

PLoS ONE

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 2015, Pages

  Cimini, Giulio ^a,b   Castellano, Claudio ^b   Sánchez, Angel ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ZARAGOZA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; COORDINATION; DYNAMICS; IMITATION; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; NETWORK GAME; PROCESS MODEL; RECREATION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT; SOCIAL NETWORK; THEORETICAL STUDY; BAYES THEOREM; BEHAVIOR; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; EVOLUTION; GAME;

BAYES THEOREM; BEHAVIOR; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL;

EID: 84925763515     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0120343     Document Type: Article

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