Stochastic stability in best shot network games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 538-554

  Boncinelli, Leonardo ^a   Pin, Paolo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PISA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Best shot game; Networks; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860611770     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001     Document Type: Article

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