Insurance and behavioral economics: Improving decisions in the most misunderstood industry

Insurance and Behavioral Economics: Improving Decisions in the Most Misunderstood Industry

Volumn 9780521845724, Issue , 2013, Pages 1-329

  Kunreuther, Howard C ^a   Pauly, Mark V ^a   McMorrow, Stacey ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b URBAN INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925667209     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139050319     Document Type: Book

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