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Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 127-139

Guaranteed renewability uniquely prevents adverse selection in individual health insurance

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Equilibrium; Guaranteed renewability; Health insurance

Indexed keywords


EID: 80052047135     PISSN: 08955646     EISSN: 15730476     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11166-011-9124-2     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (13)

References (10)
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    • Cochrane, J.1
  • 2
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    • Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection
    • Ehrlich, I., & Becker, G. S. (1972). Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection. Journal of Political Economy, 80(4), 623-648.
    • (1972) Journal of Political Economy , vol.80 , Issue.4 , pp. 623-648
    • Ehrlich, I.1    Becker, G.S.2
  • 3
    • 0032341588 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Consumer capital market constraints and guaranteed renewable insurance
    • Frick, K. (1998). Consumer capital market constraints and guaranteed renewable insurance. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 16(3), 271-278.
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    • Frick, K.1
  • 4
    • 0000255023 scopus 로고
    • Market equilibrium with private knowledge: An insurance example
    • Kunreuther, H., & Pauly, M. V. (1985). Market equilibrium with private knowledge: An insurance example. Journal of Public Economics, 26(3), 269-288.
    • (1985) Journal of Public Economics , vol.26 , Issue.3 , pp. 269-288
    • Kunreuther, H.1    Pauly, M.V.2
  • 5
    • 0001438264 scopus 로고
    • The rat race and internal labor markets
    • Miyazaki, H. (1977). The rat race and internal labor markets. Bell Journal of Economics, 8(2), 394-418.
    • (1977) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.8 , Issue.2 , pp. 394-418
    • Miyazaki, H.1
  • 6
    • 80052066576 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Time, risk, precommitment and adverse selection in competitive insurance markets
    • P.-A. Chiappori and C. Gollier (Eds.), Cambridge: MIT
    • Pauly, M. V. (2006). Time, risk, precommitment and adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In P.-A. Chiappori & C. Gollier (Eds.), Competitive failures in insurance markets (pp. 11-31). Cambridge: MIT.
    • (2006) Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets , pp. 11-31
    • Pauly, M.V.1
  • 7
    • 80052070211 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in insurance markets with experience rating
    • J. Finsinger (Ed.), London: Macmillan
    • Pauly, M. V., & Kunreuther, H. (1983). Equilibrium in insurance markets with experience rating. In J. Finsinger (Ed.), Economic analysis of regulated markets (pp. 91-110). London: Macmillan.
    • (1983) Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets , pp. 91-110
    • Pauly, M.V.1    Kunreuther, H.2
  • 9
    • 84960565386 scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information
    • Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1976). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 630-649.
    • (1976) Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol.90 , Issue.4 , pp. 630-649
    • Rothschild, M.1    Stiglitz, J.E.2
  • 10
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    • A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
    • Wilson, C. (1977). A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2), 167-207.
    • (1977) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.16 , Issue.2 , pp. 167-207
    • Wilson, C.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.