Worker absenteeism and sick pay

Worker Absenteeism and Sick Pay

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-221

  Treble, John ^a   Barmby, Tim ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84924719188     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511816154     Document Type: Book

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