A tale of two continents: Insuring workers against loss of income due to sickness in north america and europe

National Institute Economic Review

Volumn 209, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 116-125

  Treble, John ^a  

^a SWANSEA UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Optimal insurance; Optimal sorting; Sick leave; Sick pay

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349392466     PISSN: 00279501     EISSN: 17413036     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0027950109345238     Document Type: Article

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