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Volumn 60, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 367-399

Congressional politics of financing the international monetary fund

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EID: 33646270167     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818306060115     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (91)

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