Minority rights and majority power: Theoretical consequences of the motion to recommit

Legislative Studies Quarterly

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 191-217

  Krehbiel, Keith ^a   Meirowitz, Adam ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038891440     PISSN: 03629805     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3598528     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. Aldrich, John H. 1988. “Modeling the Party-in-the-Legislature." Duke University. Typescript.
2. Aldrich, John H. 1994. “A Model of a Legislature with Two Parties and a Committee System." Legislative Studies Quarterly 19:313-40.
3. Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
4. Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1995. “Theories of the Party in the Legislature and the Transition to Republican Rule in the House." Michigan State University. Typescript.
5. Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 1998. “Measuring Conditional Party Government." Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
6. Aldrich, John H., and David W. Rohde. 2000. “The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government." In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, ed. Jon Bond and Richard Fleischer. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
7. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
8. Banks, Jeffrey S., and Farid Gasmi. 1987. “Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees." Social Choice and Welfare 4:133-52.
9. Binder, Sarah. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
10. Binder, Sarah, and Steven S. Smith. 1997. Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
11. Bolles, Blair. 1951. Tyrant from Illinois. New York W.W. Norton.
12. Brady, David, Richard Brody, and David Epstein. 1989. “Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 1880-1920." Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:205-23.
13. Cooper, Joseph, and David W. Brady. 1981. “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn." American Political Science Review 75:411-25.
14. Cooper, Joseph, David W. Brady, and Patricia Hurley. 1977. “The Electoral Basis of Party Voting: Patterns and Trends in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887-1969." In The Impact of the Electoral Process, ed. Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
15. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.
16. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. “Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich's Evidence." American Journal of Political Science 41:1340-75.
17. Denzau, Arthur T., and Robert J. Mackay. 1983. “Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior." American Journal of Political Science 27:740-61.
18. Deschler, Lewis, and William Holmes Brown. 1982. Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
19. Diermeier, Daniel. 1995. “Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions." American Political Science Review 89:344-55.
20. Dion, Douglas. 1997. Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
21. Froman, Lewis A., and Randall B. Ripley. 1965. “Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats." American Political Science Review 59:52-63.
22. Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3:287-335.
23. Huitt, Ralph K. 1961. “Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate." American Political Science Review 55:333-44.
24. Jones, Charles O. 1968. “Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives." Journal of Politics 30:617-46.
25. Kramer, Gerald H. 1972. “Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces." Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2:165-80.
26. Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship." American Journal of Political Science 44:206-21.
27. Krehbiel, Keith, and Alan Wiseman. 2001. “Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois." Legislative Studies Quarterly 26:357-89.
28. Lawrence, Eric C., Forrest Maltzman, and Paul Wahlbeck. 1998. “Speaker Cannon and the Committee Assignment Process." George Washington University. Typescript.
29. Riker, William H. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74:432-46.
30. Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
31. Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1979. “The Elusive Median Voter." Journal of Public Economics 12:143-70.
32. Schickler, Eric. 1998. Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1986: A Test of Partisan and Median Voter Models. Typescript. University of California, Berkeley.
33. Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium Multidimensional Voting Models." American Journal of Political Science 23:27-59.
34. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." American Political Science Review 81:85-104.
35. U.S. Congress. [House]. Subcommittee on Rules of the House. 1992. Roundtable Discussion on the Motion to Recommit. 102d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
36. Weingast, Barry R. 1989. “Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power under the Open Rule." American Political Science Review 83:795-816.