Electoral systems and the balance of consumer-producer power

Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-262

  Chang, Eric C C ^a   Kayser, Mark Andreas ^b   Linzer, Drew A ^c   Rogowski, Ronald ^d  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HERTIE SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE   (Germany)

^c EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924002373     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511761423     Document Type: Book

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