Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-256

  McKeever, Sean ^a   Ridge, Michael ^b  

^a DAVIDSON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Generalism; Holism; Jonathan Dancy; Moral principles; Moral reasons; Particularism

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749181784     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199290652.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (144)

1. Abbott, E. A. 1952 (originally published in 1884). Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions. New York: Dover.
2. Ainslie, G. 1975. "Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control." Psychological Bulletin, 82: 463-96.
3. Ainslie, G. 1986. "Beyond Microeconomics." In Elster 1986: 133-75.
4. Armstrong, S., Gleitman, L., and Gleitman, H. 1983. "What Some Concepts Might Not Be." Cognition, 13: 263-308.
5. Baier, A. 1985. "Doing Without Moral Theory?" in Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals. London: Methuen. Reprinted in Clarke and Simpson 1989: 29-48.
6. Baldwin, T. 2002. "The Three Phases of Intuitionism." In Stratton-Lake 2002: 92-112.
7. Ball, S. 1991. "Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51: 1-30.
8. Baumeister, R., et al. 1998. "Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1252-65.
9. Blackburn, S. 1981. "Rule-Following and Moral Realism." In Holtzman and Leich 1981: 163-87.
10. Blackburn, S. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Bonjour, L. 1998. In Defence of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Brinkman, K. 1999. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, i. Ethics. Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center.
14. Burge, T. 1993. "Content Preservation." Philosophical Review, 102: 457-88.
15. Campbell, R., and Hunter, B. 2000. Moral Epistemology Naturalized: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 26 (2000) (Calgary: University of Calgary Press), 307-12.
16. Churchland, P. 1998. "The Neural Representation of the Social World." In May, Friedman, and Clark 1998: 91-108.
17. Churchland, P. 2000. "Rules, Know-How and the Future of Moral Cognition." In Campbell and Hunter 2000: 291-306.
18. Clark, A. (1998). "Connectionism, Moral Cognition, and Collaborative Problem Solving." In May, Friedman, and Clark 1998: 109-28.
19. Clark, A. 2000a. "Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition." In Campbell and Hunter 2000: 267-89.
20. Clark, A. 2000b. "Making Moral Sense: A Reply to Churchland." In Campbell and Hunter 2000: 307-12.
21. Clarke, S. (1987) "Anti-Theory in Ethics." American Philosophical Quarterly, 24/3: 237-44.
22. Clark, A. and Simpson, E. (eds.) 1989. Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
23. Crisp, R. 2000. "Particularizing Particularism." In Hooker and Little 2000: 23-47.
24. Cullity, G. 2002. "Particularism and Presumptive Reasons." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.: 169-90.
25. Dancy, J. 1981. "On Moral Properties." Mind, 90: 367-85.
26. Dancy, J. 1982. "Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology." Philosophical Studies, 42: 395-466.
27. Dancy, J. 1983. "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties." Mind, 92: 530-47.
28. Dancy, J. 1985. "The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 141-53.
29. Dancy, J. 1991a. "Intuitionism." In Singer 1991: 411-20.
30. Dancy, J. 1991b. "An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties." In Singer 1991: 219-29.
31. Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
32. Dancy, J. 1997. Reading Parfit. Oxford: Blackwell.
33. Dancy, J. 1999a. "Can the Particularist Learn the Difference between Right and Wrong?" In Brinkman 1999: 59-72.
34. Dancy, J. 1999b. "Defending Particularism." Metaphilosophy, 30: 25-32.
35. Dancy, J. 2000. "The Particularist's Progress." In Hooker and Little 2000: 130-56.
36. Dancy, J. 2001. "Moral Particularism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online at
37. Dancy, J. 2003. "Are There Organic Unities?" Ethics, 113: 629-50.
38. Dancy, J. 2004. Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
39. Dancy, J. forthcoming. "Defending the Right." Journal of Moral Philosophy.
40. Daniels, N. 1996. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
41. Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., and Railton, P. 1992. "Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends." Philosophical Review, 101: 115-89.
42. DeGroot, A. 1978. Thought and Choice in Chess. The Hague: Mouton.
43. Dennett, D. 1995. Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Simon and Schuster.
44. Drefyus, H. I., and Dreyfus, S. E. 1986. Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuitive Expertise in the Era of the Computer. New York: Free Press.
45. Drefyus, H. I. 1990. "What is Morality? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise." In Rasmussen 1990: 237-64.
46. Driver, J. forthcoming. "Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise." Philosophical Studies.
47. Elster, J. (ed.) 1986. The Multiple Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
48. Evans, G. 1985. "Reference and Contingency." in Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49. Firth, R. 1952. "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12: 317-45.
50. Frankena, W. 1939. "The Naturalistic Fallacy." Mind, 48: 464-77.
51. Fried, C. 1981. Contract as Promise. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
52. Gert, B. 1966. The Moral Rules. New York: Harper and Row.
53. Gert, B. 1998. Morality: Its Nature and Justification. New York: Oxford University Press.
54. Gert, B. 2004. Common Morality: Deciding What to Do. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
55. Giaquinto, M. 1998. "Epistemology of the Obvious: A Geometrical Case." Philosophical Studies, 92: 181-204.
56. Gibbard, A. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
57. Gligoric, S. 2002. I Play against Pieces. London: Batsford.
58. Glover, J. 2000. Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
59. Goldman, A. 1993. "Ethics and Cognitive Science." Ethics, 103: 337-60.
60. Haidt, J. 2001. "The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." Psychological Review, 108: 814-34.
61. Hare, R. M. 1981. Moral Thinking. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
62. Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
63. Harman, G. 1989. Change in View. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
64. Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
65. Hawthorne, J. 2002. "Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65/2: 247-69.
66. Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
67. Holton, R. 2002. "Principles and Particularisms." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.: 169-20.
68. Holtzman, S., and Leich, C. (eds.) 1981. Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
69. Hooker, B. 2000a. Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
70. Hooker, B. 2000b. "Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad." In Hooker and Little 2000: 1-22.
71. Hooker, B. 2002. "Ross-style General Principles." In Stratton-Lake 2002: 161-83.
72. Hooker, B. and Little, M. 2000. Moral Particularism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
73. Horowitz, T. 1998. "Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory." Ethics, 108: 367-8.
74. Hume, D. 1985. Essays: Moral, Political and Literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
75. Hursthouse, R. 1995. Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. New York: Clarendon Press.
76. Irwin, T. 2000. "Ethics as Inexact Science: Aristotle's Ambitions for Moral Theory." In Hooker and Little 2000: 100-29.
77. Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
78. Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. 1995. "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation." Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 20-39.
79. Jackson, F., Pettit, P. and Smith, M. 2000. "Ethical Particularism and Patterns." In Hooker and Little 2000: 79-99.
80. James, R. 1989. The Complete Chess Addict. London: Faber and Faber.
81. Jamieson, D. 2002a. Morality's Progress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
82. Jamieson, D. 2002b. "Is There Progress in Morality?" Utilitas, 14: 318-38.
83. Jones, K. 1999. "Second-Hand Moral Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy, 96/2: 55-78.
84. Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." Econometrica, 47: 263-91.
85. Kamm, F. 1998. "Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology and the Harming vs. Not-Aiding Distinction." Ethics, 108: 463-88.
86. Kant, I. 2002 (originally published in 1784). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. T. E. Hill, Jr. and A. Zweig. New York: Oxford University Press.
87. Kirsh, D., and Maglio, P. 1992. "Reaction and Reflection in Tetris." In J. Handler (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Planning Systems: Proceedings of the First Annual International Conference, AIPS 92. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kauffman.
88. Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
89. Lance, M., and Little, M. 2004. "Defeasibility and the Normative Grasp of Context." Erkenntnis, 61: 435-55.
90. Lance, M., and Little, M. 2005. "Particularism and Anti-Theory." In D. Copp (ed.), Essays in Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
91. Lance, M., and O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1997. The Grammar of Meaning: The Normativity of Semantic Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
92. Lange, M. 2002. "Who's Afraid of Ceteris Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them." Erkenntnis, 57: 407-23.
93. Little, M. 1994. "Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalism." Philosophical Books, 35/4: 225-32.
94. Little, M. 1995. "Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology." Hypatia, 10/3: 117-37.
95. Little, M. 1997. "Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind." Nous, 31: 59-79.
96. Little, M. 2000. "Moral Generalities Revisited." In Hooker and Little 2000: 276-304.
97. Little, M. 2001. "On Knowing the 'Why:' Particularism and Moral Theory." Hastings Center Report, 32-40.
98. McDowell, J. 1979. "Virtue and Reason." The Monist, 62: 331-50.
99. McDowell, J. 1981. "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following." In Holtzman and Leich 1981: 141-62.
100. McDowell, J. 1985. "Values and Secondary Qualities." In T. Honderich, Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 110-20. Reprinted in Sayre-McCord 1988: 166-80.
101. McDowell, J. 1998. Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
102. Mackie, J. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin.
103. McGrath, S. forthcoming. "Moral Knowledge." Philosophical Perspectives.
104. McKeever, S., and Ridge, M. 2005. "What Does Holism Have to Do with Particularism?" Ratio, 18: 93-103.
105. McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Blackwell.
106. McNaughton, D. 1996. "An Unconnected Heap of Duties?" Philosophical Quarterly, 46: 443-7.
107. McNaughton, D. and Rawlings, P. 2000. "Unprincipled Ethics." In Hooker and Little 2000: 256-75.
108. May, L., Friedman, M., and Clark, A. (eds.) 1998. Mind and Morals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
109. Mill, J. 1979 (originally published in 1861). Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett.
110. Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. New York: Cambridge University Press.
111. Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
112. Nagel, T. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
113. Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
114. Ogilvy, J. (ed.) 1986. Revisioning Philosophy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
115. Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
116. Penrose, R. 1989. The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
117. Pietroski, P., and Rey, G. 1995. "When Other Things Are Not Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46: 84-110.
118. Railton, P. 1984. "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13/2: 134-71.
119. Rasmussen, D. (ed.) 1990. Universalism vs. Communitarianism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
120. Reti, R. 1960 (originally published in 1943). Modern Ideas in Chess. New York: Dover.
121. Ridge, M. 2003a. "Review of Judith Thomson's Goodness and Advice." Ethics, 113/2: 447-50.
122. Ridge, M. 2003b. "Non-Naturalism in Meta-Ethics." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online at.
123. Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
124. Ross, W. D. 1939. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
125. Rowson, J. 2000. The Seven Deadly Chess Sins. London: Gambit.
126. Salmon, W. 1967. The Foundations of Scientific Inference. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
127. Sayre-McCord, G. 1988. Essays in Moral Realism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
128. Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
129. Scheffler, S. 1992. Human Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
130. Sidgwick, H. 1967 (originally published in 1907). The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
131. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. 1999. "Some Varieties of Particularism." Metaphilosophy, 30: 1-12.
132. Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
133. Sommerfield, D. 1991. "Modest A Priori Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51: 39-66.
134. Sorensen, R. 1995. "Unknowable Obligations." Utilitas, 7/2: 247-71.
135. Stewart, I. 2001. Flatterland: Like Flatland, Only More So. London: Pan.
136. Stratton-Lake, P. 2000. Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth. New York: Routledge.
137. Stratton-Lake, P. 2002. Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
138. Thomson, J. 1971. "A Defense of Abortion." Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 47-66.
139. Thomson, J. 2001. Goodness and Advice (ed. A. Gutman). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
140. Urmson, J. 1975. "A Defence of Intuitionism." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 75: 111-19.
141. Väyrynen, P. 2004. "Particularism and Default Reasons." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7: 53-79.
142. Watson, J. 1998. Secrets of Modern Chess Strategy. London: Gambit.
143. Wilson, T., and Schooler, J. 1991. "Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 181-92.
144. Wolff, J. P. 1970. In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper.