From 'is' to 'ought' in moral epistemology

Argumentation

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 159-174

  Sinnott Armstrong, Walter ^a  

^a Dartmouth College   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Is; Moral; Nelson; Nihilism; Ought

Indexed keywords

EID: 42449098576     PISSN: 0920427X     EISSN: 15728374     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007861512274     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Harman, Gilbert: 1977, The Nature of Morality, Oxford University Press, New York.
2. Hume, D.: 1739-1740, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
3. Lehrer, K.: 1974, Knowledge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
4. Lehrer, K.: 1990, Theory of Knowledge, Westview Press, Boulder.
5. Mackie, J.L.: 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin, New York.
6. Nelson, M.: 1995, 'Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values from Facts?', Argumentation 9, 553-562.
7. Pigden, Charles: 1991, 'Naturalism', in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 421-431.
8. Sinnott-Armstrong, W.: 1996, 'Moral Skepticism and Justification', in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York.
9. Thomson, J.: 1990, The Realm of Rights, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.