Collapse of cooperation in evolving games

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue 49, 2014, Pages 17558-17563

  Stewart, Alexander J ^a   Plotkin, Joshua B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolution; Game theory; Iiterated games; Prisoner's Dilemma

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COEVOLUTION; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; COOPERATION; GAME; HERITABILITY; HUMAN; MUTATION; POPULATION RESEARCH; REWARD; BACTERIUM; EVOLUTION; GENOTYPE; HUMAN RELATION; MEMORY; RECREATION;

BACTERIA; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; GENOTYPE; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MEMORY; MUTATION; RECREATION; REWARD;

EID: 84918524907     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1408618111     Document Type: Article

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