Dynamic elite partisanship: Party loyalty and agenda setting in the US house

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 741-772

  Lindstädt, René ^a   Vander Wielen, Ryan J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84910642684     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123413000173     Document Type: Article

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