Timely shirking: Time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate

Public Choice

Volumn 148, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 119-148

  Lindstadt R ^a   Vander Wielen, Ryan J ^b  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^b TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Legislative institutions; Legislative politics; Shirking; U.S. Congress; U.S. Senate

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956287290     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9649-y     Document Type: Article

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