Collective action and the evolution of social norms

Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2014, Pages 235-252

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84907440920     PISSN: 19390459     EISSN: 19390467     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/19390459.2014.935173     Document Type: Article

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