Crowdsourcing with all-pay auctions: A field experiment on Taskcn

Management Science

Volumn 60, Issue 8, 2014, Pages 220-237

  Liu, Tracy Xiao ^a   Yang, Jiang ^b   Adamic, Lada A ^c   Chen, Yan ^c  

^a Tsinghua University   (China)

^b IBM   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

All pay auctions; Crowdsourcing; Field experiment

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

ALL-PAY AUCTIONS; CROWDSOURCING; FIELD EXPERIMENT; HIGH QUALITY; HIGH-QUALITY SOLUTIONS; OVERALL QUALITY;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84905743437     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845     Document Type: Article

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