Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 189-206

  Noussair, Charles ^a   Silver, Jonathon ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

All pay; Auction; Experiment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644932154     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.005     Document Type: Article

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