Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 119-128

  DiPalantino, Dominic ^a   Vojnović, Milan ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

All pay auctions; Contests; Crowdsourcing; Game theory

Indexed keywords

ALL-PAY AUCTIONS; EMPIRICAL DATA; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; TWO-REGIME;

ECONOMICS; ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77950592418     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566392     Document Type: Conference Paper

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