International negotiations in the shadow of national elections

International Organization

Volumn 68, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 701-720

  Rickard, Stephanie J ^a   Caraway, Teri L ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904973553     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818314000058     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (44)

1. Anner, Mark, and Teri L. Caraway. 2010. International Institutions and Workers' Rights: Between Labor Standards and Market Flexibility. Studies in Comparative International Development 45 (2):151-69
2. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
3. Bienen, Henry S., and Mark Gersovitz. 1985. Economic Stabilization, Conditionality, and Political Stability. International Organization 39 (4):729-54
4. Bird, Graham. 1996. Borrowing from the IMF: The Policy Implications of Recent Empirical Research. World Development 24 (11):1753-60
5. Caraway, Teri L., Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark Anner. 2012. International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality. International Organization 66 (1):27-61
6. Conconi, Paola, Giovanni Facchini, and Maurizio Zanardi. 2012. Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reform. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8561. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research
7. Copelovitch, Mark S. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts. New York: Cambridge University Press
8. Davis, Christina L. 2012. Why Adjudicate?. Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
9. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy 65 (2):135-50
10. Dreher, Axel. 2003. The Influence of Elections on IMF Program Interruptions. Journal of Development Studies 39 (6):101-20
11. Dreher, Axel, and Martin Gassebner. 2012. Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises?. An Empirical Analysis. International Organization 66 (2):329-58
12. Dreher, Axel, and Nathan M. Jensen. 2007. Independent Actor or Agent?. An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions. Journal of Law and Economics 50 (1):105-24
13. Gould, Erica. 2006. Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, and Supplementary Financiers. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
14. Greenhill, Brian, Layna Mosley, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986-2002. American Political Science Review 103 (4):669-90
15. Hafner-Burton, Emilie. 2009. Forced to Be Good: Why Trade Agreements Boost Human Rights. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
16. Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
17. Hillman, John R. 1980. The Mutual Influence of Italian Domestic Politics and the International Monetary Fund. Fletcher Forum 4 (1):1-33
18. Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. Which Elections Can Be Lost?. Political Analysis 20 (2):191-210
19. Kahler, Miles. 1993. Bargaining with the IMF: Two-Level Strategies and Developing Countries. In Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, edited by Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, 363-94. Berkeley: University of California Press
20. Kim, Moonhawk. 2012. Ex Ante Due Diligence: Formation of PTAs and Protection of Labor Rights. International Studies Quarterly 56 (4):704-19
21. Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. American Political Science Review 100 (3):369-84
22. Kono, Daniel Y. 2008. Democracy and Trade Discrimination. Journal of Politics 70 (4):942-55
23. Leblang, David A. 2002. The Political Economy of Speculative Attacks in the Developing World. International Studies Quarterly 46 (1):69-91
24. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2000. Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science 3:183-219
25. Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. Endogenous Tariff Formation. American Economic Review 74 (5):970-85
26. Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
27. Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1):117-46
28. Moser, Christoph, and Jan-Egbert Sturm. 2011. Explaining IMF Lending Decisions After the Cold War. Review of International Organizations 6 (3-4):307-40
29. Mosley, Layna. 2011. Labor Rights and Multinational Production. New York: Cambridge University Press
30. Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
31. Przeworski, Adam, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2000. The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth. Journal of Development Economics 62 (2):385-421
32. Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42 (3):427-60
33. Rickard, Stephanie J., and Teri L Caraway. 2014. The International Politics of Austerity: The Puzzling Case of Public Sector Reforms. Paper presented at the seventh Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organization. 16-18 Jaunary, Princeton
34. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
35. Steinwand, Martin C., and Randall W. Stone. 2008. The International Monetary Fund: A Review of the Recent Evidence. Review of International Organization 3 (2):123-49
36. Stone, Randall W. 2002. Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
37. Stone, Randall W. 2004. The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. American Political Science Review 98 (4): 577-91
38. Stone, Randall W. 2008. The Scope of IMF Conditionality. International Organization 62 (4):589-620
39. Stone, Randall W. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press
40. Thacker, Strom. 1999. The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics 52 (1):38-75
41. Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University Press
42. Stone, Randall W. 2007. The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending. New York: Routledge
43. Weingast, Barry, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics. Journal of Political Economy 89 (4):642-64
44. Wolfensohn, James. 2013. "Reflections on a Changing World: 1950-2050." Public lecture delivered at the London School of Economics, London, 29 May