Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 107-116

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination games; Evolutionary game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035538781     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820100067     Document Type: Article

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