The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 91, Issue , 2013, Pages 122-130

  Bernard, Mark ^a   Dreber, Anna ^b   Strimling, Pontus ^c   Eriksson, Kimmo ^c  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^c STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Common pool resource; Cooperation; Polycentricity; Subgroups; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878165060     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.009     Document Type: Article

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