The concept of governance in dual-use research

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 447-457

  Dubov, Alex ^a  

^a DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Academic freedom; Bioterrorism; Dual use research of concern; Research oversight; Research safety; Risk benefit assessment

Indexed keywords

ACCESS TO INFORMATION; BIOMEDICINE; BIOTERRORISM; CONFIDENTIALITY; COOPERATION; DUAL USE RESEARCH; ETHICS; HUMAN; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE; MORALITY; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; POLICY; PREVENTION AND CONTROL;

ACCESS TO INFORMATION; BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES; BIOTERRORISM; CONFIDENTIALITY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DUAL USE RESEARCH; HUMANS; INTERNATIONALITY; MORALS; OWNERSHIP; PUBLIC POLICY;

EID: 84903900216     PISSN: 13867423     EISSN: 15728633     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11019-013-9542-9     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. As quoted in "J. Robert Oppenheimer" by L. Barnett, in Life, Vol. 7, No. 9, International Edition (24 October 1949), p. 58.
2. Atkinson, Richard. C. 1978. Rights and responsibilities in scientific research. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 34(10): 10-14.
3. Beauchamp, T. L., and J. F. Childress. 2001a. Principles of biomedical ethics, 5. USA: Oxford University Press.
4. Beauchamp, T. L., and J. F. Childress. 2001b. Principles of biomedical ethics, 117-123. USA: Oxford University Press.
5. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 2005. Report of the meeting of experts. BWC/MSP/2005/MX/3. Geneva, 5 August. http://www. opbw. org/new_process/mx2005/bwc_msp. 2005_mx_3_E. pdf.
6. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 2008. Report of the meeting of experts. BWC/MSP/2008/MX/3. Geneva, 8 September. http://www. opbw. org/new_process/mx2008/BWC_MSP_2008_MX_3_E. pdf.
7. Briggle, A. 2009. Tempting fate: The ethics of dual-use research. Nanoethics 3: 75-77.
8. Carlson, R. 2003. The pace and proliferation of biological technologies. Biosecurity and bioterrorism: Biodefense strategy, practice and science 1(3): 203-214.
9. Cello, J., A. V. Paul, and E. Wimmer. 2002. Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science 297(5583): 1016-1018.
10. Cohen, P. 2003. Recipes for bioterror. New Scientist 177(2378): 10-11.
11. Committee on Publication Ethics. About COPE. http://publicationethics. org/about. Accessed September 18, 2013.
12. Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, National Research Council of the National Academies, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (The Fink Report). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2004, p. 15.
13. Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, National Research Council of the National Academies, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (The Fink Report). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2004, p. 12.
14. David Malakoff. 2012. US requires new dual-use biological research reviews. Science Insider March 29, 2012. http://news. sciencemag. org/scienceinsider/2012/03/us-requires-new-dual-use-biologi. html.
15. Epstein, Gerald L. 2001. Controlling biological warfare threats: Resolving potential tensions among the research community, industry, and the national security community. Critical Reviews in Microbiology 27(4): 321-354.
16. Forge, J. 2010. A note on the definition of 'Dual Use'. Science and Engineering Ethics 16: 111-118.
17. Fouchier, R. A., S. Herfst, and A. D. M. E. Osterhaus. 2012. Restricted data on influenza H5N1 virus transmission. Science 335(6069): 662-663.
18. Harris, E. D. 2012. Dual use biotechnology research: The case for protective oversight. In A web of prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the governance of research, ed. C. McLeish, and B. Rappert, 116-117. London: Routledge.
19. InterAcademy Council, and IAP. 2012. Responsible conduct in the global research enterprise: A policy report. Amsterdam: IAC Secretariat; Trieste: IAP Secretariat. http://www. interacademies. net/File. aspx?id=19789.
20. International Atomic Energy Agency. History of the IAEA. http://www. iaea. org/About/history. html. Accessed on 7/25/2012.
21. Jackson, R. J. et al. (2001). Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox. Journal of Virology 75(3): 1205-1210.
22. Jones, S., and J. Karreth. 2011. Assessing the economic impact of adopting strategic trade controls. Retrieved from: http://www. state. gov/documents/organization/156673. pdf (2010), 11 (note 25).
23. Keele, Alexander. 2012. H5N1: Bungling dual-use governance. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 29 March 2012. http://www. thebulletin. org/web-edition/columnists/alexander-kelle/h5n1-bungling-dual-use-governance.
24. Kittelsen, Sonja. 2009. Conceptualizing biorisk: Dread risk and the threat of bioterrorism in Europe. Security Dialogue 40(1): 51-71.
25. Knowles, L. P. 2012. Current dual-use governance measures. In A web of prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the governance of research, ed. C. McLeish, and B. Rappert, 45. London: Routledge.
26. Koblentz, G. D. 2009. Living weapons: Biological warfare and international security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 235.
27. Kruger, Heleen, Lyndal Thompson, Rachel Clarke, Nyree Stenekes, and Anna Carr. 2009. Engaging in biosecurity: Gap analysis. Canberra: Australian Government: Bureau of Rural Sciences 39.
28. Kuhlau, Frida, Anna T. Höglund, Kathinka Evers, and Stefan Eriksson. 2011. A precautionary principle for dual use research in the life sciences. Bioethics 25(1): 1-8.
29. MacKenzie, D. 2003. US develops lethal new viruses. New Scientist 29: 6-7.
30. Marchant, Gary E., and Lynda L. Pope. 2009. The problems with forbidding science. Science and Engineering Ethics 15(3): 375-394.
31. Maurer, S. M., and L. Zoloth. 2007. Synthesizing biosecurity. Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences 63(6): 16-18.
32. McLeish, C., and B. Rappert. 2012. A web of prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the governance of research, 33. London: Routledge.
33. Miller, S., and M. Selgelid. 2007. Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological sciences. Science and Engineering Ethics 13: 523-580.
34. Morgan, M. G. 1993 Risk analysis and management. Scientific American 32-41.
35. National Research Council. 2004. Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism. Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences. http://www. nap. edu/books/0309089778/html/.
36. National Research Council. (2009). A survey of attitudes and actions on dual use research in the life sciences: A collaborative effort of the national research council and the American Association for the advancement of science, 135-136. National Academies Press.
37. National Research Council, A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (National Academies Press, 2009), 135-136.
38. Obama Barack. 2009. National strategy for countering biological threats. 8, 13, 15-16. Washington DC: National Security Council.
39. Patrone, Daniel, David Resnik, and Lisa Chin. 2012. Biosecurity and the review and publication of dual-use research of concern. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10(3): 290-298.
40. Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information. A Report of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). June 2007. p. 17 retrieved from: http://www. biosecurityboard. gov/Framework%20for%20transmittal%200807_Sept07. pdf. Accessed 7/25/12.
41. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 1 July 1970. http://www. fas. org/sgp/othergov/dsbrep. html.
42. Resnik, D. B. 2006. Openness versus secrecy in scientific research abstract. Episteme (Edinb) 2(3): 135-147.
43. Resnik, D. 2009. What is dual use research? A response to Miller and Selgelied. Science and Engineering Ethics 15: 3-5.
44. Resnik, D. 2010. Can scientists regulate the publication of dual use research? Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4(1). Article 6.
45. Resnik, D. B., and A. Shamoo. 2005. Bioterrorism and the responsible conduct of biomedical research. Drug Development Research 63: 121-133.
46. Resnik, David B., Dionne D. Barner, and Gregg E. Dinse. 2011. Dual-use review policies of biomedical research journals. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 9(1): 49-54.
47. Rhodes, R. A. W. 1996. The new governance: Governing without government. Political Studies 44(4): 657-660.
48. Scolve, R. 2010. Reinventing technology assessment: A 21 century model. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 43. http://wilsoncenter. org/sites/default/files/ReinventingTechnologyAssessment1. pdf.
49. Selgelid, M. 2007. A tale of two studies: Ethics, bioterrorism, and the censorship of science. Hastings Center Report 37(3): 35-43.
50. Selgelid, Michael J. 2009. Dual-use research codes of conduct: Lessons from the life sciences. NanoEthics 3(3): 175-183.
51. Steinbruner, John, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther. 2003. Controlling dangerous pathogens: A prototype protective oversight system, 5 February 2003. www. cissm. umd. edu/papers/files/pathogens_project_monograph. pdf. Accessed September 18, 2013.
52. Stoker, G. 1998. Governance as theory: Five propositions. International Social Science Journal 50(155): 17-23.
53. Tucker, J. B., and R. Danzing. 2012. Innovation, dual use, and security: Managing the risks of emerging biological and chemical technologies, 19. Cambridge: MIT Press.
54. Tumpey, T. M., et al. 2005. Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Science 310(5745): 77-80.
55. United Nations. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (10 April 1972). http://www. unog. ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C4048678A93B6934C1257188004848D0/$file/BWC-text-English. pdf.
56. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Assessing the risks, OTA-ISC-559. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, August 1993, 1011.
57. Webster, R. G. 2012. Mammalian-transmissible H5N1 influenza: The dilemma of dual research. mBio 3(1): 1-2.
58. Wilson, David A. 1986. Federal control of information in academic science. Jurimetrics J 27: 283.
59. Wolinetz, Carrie D. 2012. Implementing the new US dual-use policy. Science 336(6088): 1525-1527.
60. World Health Organization. 2012. Report on technical consultation on H5N1 research issues. Geneva: WHO.