A precautionary principle for dual use research in the life sciences

Bioethics

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-8

  Kuhlau, Frida ^a   Höglund, Anna T ^a   Evers, Kathinka ^a   Eriksson, Stefan ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Biological weapons; Dual use; Life science research; Precautionary principle; Responsibility

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; BIOMEDICINE; ETHICS; HUMAN; MEDICAL RESEARCH; POLICY; RISK ASSESSMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; UNCERTAINTY;

BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE DISCIPLINES; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH; HUMANS; PUBLIC POLICY; RISK ASSESSMENT; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 78650281347     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01740.x     Document Type: Article

References (51)

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