Attacked from Both Sides: A Dynamic Model of Multinational Corporations' Strategies for Protection of Their Property Rights

Global Strategy Journal

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 1-26

  Bucheli, Marcelo ^a   Kim, Minyoung ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Business history; Obsolescing bargaining power theory; Property rights theory; Transaction costs economics theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84903546773     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20425805     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/gsj.1090     Document Type: Article

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