Level-0 meta-models for predicting human behavior in games

EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 857-873

  Wright, James R ^a   Leyton Brown, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

behavioral game theory; bounded rationality; cognitive hierarchy; cognitive models; game theory; level k; prediction

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; FORECASTING; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SOCIAL SCIENCES;

BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY; BOUNDED RATIONALITY; COGNITIVE HIERARCHY; COGNITIVE MODEL; LEVEL-K;

MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

EID: 84903171251     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602907     Document Type: Conference Paper

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