Equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in symmetric normal-form games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 98-119

  Haruvy, Ernan ^a   Stahl, Dale O ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Equilibrium selection; Heterogeneity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845573924     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.002     Document Type: Article

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