Beyond equilibrium: Predicting human behavior in normal-form games

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 901-907

  Wright, James R ^a   Leyton Brown, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COMPUTATION THEORY; ECONOMICS;

BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; HUMAN BEHAVIORS; META ANALYSIS; MULTI-AGENT SETTING; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; NORMAL FORM GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77958566715     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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