Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1440-1467

  Rogers, Brian W ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^b   Camerer, Colin F ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Cognitive hierarchy; Experimental economics; Game theory; Quantal response equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649525220     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.010     Document Type: Article

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