The tennis coach problem: A game-theoretic and experimental study

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2012, Pages

  Arad, Ayala ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

colonel Blotto; experimental game theory; level k thinking; tennis coach problem

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873695900     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1738     Document Type: Article

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