Competitive parity, status disparity, and mutual forbearance: Securities analysts' competition for investor attention

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 38-62

  Bowers, Anne H ^a   Greve, Henrich R ^b   Mitsuhashi, Hitoshi ^c   Baum, Joel A C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b INSEAD   (France)

^c KEIO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84900441862     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2011.0818     Document Type: Article

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