Belief polarization is not always irrational

Psychological Review

Volumn 121, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 206-224

  Jern, Alan ^a   Chang, Kai Min K ^b   Kemp, Charles ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University

Author keywords

Bayesian networks; Belief polarization; Belief revision; Rationality; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

BAYES THEOREM; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; DECISION MAKING; EXECUTIVE FUNCTION; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL;

BAYES THEOREM; CULTURE; DECISION MAKING; EXECUTIVE FUNCTION; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; JUDGMENT; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 84898663831     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0035941     Document Type: Article

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