Temporal dynamics and heterogeneity in the quantitative study of international conflict

Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 273-288

  Box Steffensmeier, Janet M ^a   Reiter, Dan ^b   Zorn, Christopher J ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84898130026     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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