Time remembered: A dynamic model of interstate interaction

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 409-431

  Crescenzi, Mark J C ^a,b   Enterline, Andrew J ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; MODEL; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034855703     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00207     Document Type: Article

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