The reputational and social network benefits of rosociality in an Andean community

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue 13, 2014, Pages 4820-4825

  Lyle, Henry F ^a   Smith, Eric A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Free rider problem; Signaling; Social support

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; FEMALE; HOUSEHOLD; HUMAN; INDIGENOUS PEOPLE; INVESTMENT; MALE; MORBIDITY; PERU; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RELIABILITY; SOCIAL LIFE; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIAL SUPPORT;

EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION; FREE-RIDER PROBLEM; SIGNALING; SOCIAL SUPPORT;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; AGRICULTURE; ANIMALS; CHILD; HUMANS; LINEAR MODELS; MIDDLE AGED; PERU; RESIDENCE CHARACTERISTICS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL SUPPORT; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84897504017     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1318372111     Document Type: Article

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